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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Lyle C. Hendricks,
Petitioner/Appellant

-vs-

:

PETITIONER'S APPELLANT
BRIEF

:

State of Utah,

:

Respondent/Appellee

Case No. 930055-CA

:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Petition for Extraordinary Relief is not a successive or delayed petition, nor is it
repetitious, when through Petitioner's own diligence new evidence is obtained
showing perjured testimony regarding the formulation of "intent" which subsequently
resulted in a conviction for an offense which was not committed. Ineffective
assistance of counsel.
REPORT OF DECISION
The [r]uling on writ of extraordinary relief by Judge Michael Glasmann of the
Second Judicial District Court of January 12th, 1993. Docketing Statement of
February 16th, 1993, and Utah Court of Appeals Order Case 930055-CA by Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge dated March 23rd, 1993 is attached.
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The decision previously referred to was filed on January 12th, 1993. No
orders granting extension have been granted. The Utah Court of Appeals has
1

jurisdiction pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3 (2) (g) of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 65 B (b) (13) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
See Addendum
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

This is an appeal from a ruling in the Second Judicial District Court Pursuant to

the dismissal of a Petition for Extraordinary Relief which was filed under Rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based on newly discovered evidence regarding the
veracity of one of the state's key witnesses.
2.

The witnesses testimony was relied upon for the formulation of "intent" in the

crime of aggravated robbery.
3.

Appellant now has proof the this witnesses testimony was false.

4.

Dismissal of the original petition by Judge Glasmann was on the grounds of

being repetitious; frivolous.
5.

Notice of Appeal was filed with the Utah Court of Appeals on January 29th,

1993.
6.

Appellee's Motion to Dismiss before this court was denied on March 23, 1993,

by Judge Garff.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the afternoon of December 8, 1987, an individual later identified as the
2

Appellant, Lyle C. Hendricks, entered Murray's Pharmacy and walked to the back of
the store where the pharmacy's owner, Mr. Murray and an employee, Mrs.
Blackwell, were working. He had a gun in his hand and asked the owner, Mr.
Murray, for all of his class II narcotics. Mr. Murray replied that he did not have any
class II narcotics and when questioned opened a drawer to show Mr. Hendricks that it
was empty. At that point, Mr. Hendricks turned around and walked out stating that he
was "only joking anyway". Mr. Murray immediately telephoned the police as Mrs.
Blackwell went to the front door. Mrs. Blackwell identified the Appellant's car leaving
the parking lot of the pharmacy. Mr. Murray forwarded the information to the Ogden
City Police Department which led to Appellant's later apprehension and the recovery
of an unloaded nine millimeter handgun. The vehicle was seen by Ogden City police
officers and after a chase, the vehicle stopped near 24th Street and Jefferson. Mrs.
Blackwell was taken to the area where she identified the vehicle as the one leaving
Murray's Pharmacy.
Mr. Hendricks was arrested as a suspect in the robbery and both witnesses
were brought to the jail to be present at a line-up. both Mr. Murray and Mrs. Blackwell
picked the Appellant out of the line-up as the individual who entered Murray's
Pharmacy with a gun. While waiting for the line-up to occur, Mr. Hendricks kept
indicating his innocence to Officer Zimmermann until finally Officer Zimmermann
advised him of his Miranda rights. After being advised, Mr. Hendricks indicated he
wanted to talk. During the course of the interrogation, the Appellant indicated a
3

series of facts regarding himself and his vehicle, but finally admitted he had gone into
Murray's pharmacy, but not to commit an armed robbery Mr Hendricks claimed he
entered the pharmacy at about 2 30 or 2 45 to get some cold medicine At that point,
Officer Zimmermann indicated that the Appellant wouldn't answer any more of his
questions
After the initial questioning was terminated the Appellant (Mr Hendricks) did
not talk to any of the officers until the next morning when an Officer Minor happened to
be present in the jail during a video arraignment process

Mr Hendricks had

apparently been unable to come to terms with his private counsel, Paul Stockdale,
and was requesting the assistance of a public defender At this time, a M r G Scott
Jensen was appearing for the Public Defenders Association to handle video
arraignments on the morning law and motion calendar

Throughout the arraignment

process Mr Jensen was present with the Appellant and Detective Minor

Detective

Minor did not renew the Miranda warnings with Mr Hendricks, and even so,
proceeded to ask Mr Hendricks questions regarding the robbery charge

During that

discussion no statements adverse to the Appellant's position were given
Subsequently

Detective Minor formulated a report and testified at Appellant's trial

that during this period Mr Hendricks "confessed" to him the required intentional
elements of the crime of aggravated robbery Detective Minor stated that Mr G Scott
Jensen was present during this confession
At trial, during the testimony of Detective Minor the Appellant, Mr Hendricks
4

objected. A conference was held in judges chambers and the Appellants trial
counsel, Stephen Laker, was told to contact Mr. Jensen, At this point the court
recognized if Detective Minor's testimony about the confession were untrue the jury
would be tainted and a mistrial would be in order. Appellant's trial counsel, Stephen
Laker did not attempt to contact Mr. Jensen as the court instructed. As a result of this
indifference perjured testimony entered into the record and this testimony played a
major part in the juries verdict. It is only now, several years later, through Mr.
Hendricks own diligence that he has obtained a affidavit from Mr. Jensen. This
affidavit proves Appellant's contention that there never was a "confession" to
Detective Minor.
ARGUMENT

Point 1
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IN THIS CASE IS NOT A
SUCCESSIVE OR REPETITIOUS PETITION WHEN PETITIONER'S DILIGENCE
PROVIDES NEW EVIDENCE IN ADDITION TO DEMONSTRATION A COLORABLE
SHOWING OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE.
In Sanders v. United States. 373 U.S. 1 (1963) the Supreme Court stated that
successive petitions can be denied if three conditions are evident: first, the same
ground presented in the subsequent petition was decided adversely to the petitioner
on the prior petition; second, the prior determination was on the merits; and third,
"ends of justice" would not be served by reconsideration of the claim.
While it is true that the Appellant has filed a previous petition and his post-
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conviction appeal, his claim has never been bourne out to the current level as he
now has hard evidence showing that a highly prejudicial interrogation never took
place between himself and a Detective Minor. In previously raising a ineffectiveness
of counsel claim, Appellant has stated that he did object through his trial counsel,
one Stephen Laker, about the false nature of Detective Minor's testimony. Then, the
trial court immediately called for a conference in chambers where both counsels were
instructed as to the fact that if the Detective's testimony were in fact false, a mistrial
would result. Defense counsel was then instructed to contact the attorney present at
the video arraignment, one G. Scott Jensen, for verification. This never occurred.
Appellant contends that the "ends of justice" require an intense
reconsideration of this claim. Even if "abuse of the writ" is found, however, the court
may not dismiss the petition if the "ends of justice" require consideration of the claim.
Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18-19. A claim of constitutional magnitude is involved. In White
v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 89 LEd 1348, 65 SCt 978 (1953) the United States Supreme
Court held that a conviction secured by the use of perjured testimony known to be
such by the prosecuting attorney is lacking due process. In addition, the case of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents. 403 U.S. 388, 29 LEd 2d 619, 91 SCt 1999 (1971),
the Court held that government agents who act in an unconstitutional manner become
liable for monetary damages.
Notwithstanding liability here, for it appears that the real damage has been
done to Mr. Hendricks. The Appellant, Lyle Hendricks, has brought a showing of
6

good cause that justifies the filing of a successive habeas corpus claim as stated by
the Utah court in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) where the Court
stipulated that such a showing of good cause may be established by showing: (1) the
denial of a constitutional right pursuant to a new law that is, or might be, retroactive;
(2) new facts not previously known that would show the denial of a constitutional right
or might change the outcome of the trial; (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness
in a conviction; (4) the illegality of a sentence; or (5) a claim overlooked in good faith
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ.
Clearly, the affidavits of G. Scott Jensen constitute the requisite new facts
consisting of a denial of due process claim, Mr. Jensen was present at the video
arraignment, and in stating that the interrogation by Detective Minor never took
place, the State now lacks the intent necessary to prove the crime of aggravated
robbery. A condition that would have most definitely changed the outcome of the trial.
The existence of such a fundamental unfairness goes to the heart of the
purpose of the writ. Habeas Corpus is not to be used to review a final judgment
arrived at through regular proceedings and due process of law by a court having
jurisdiction, but it is to be used to protect anyone who is restrained of his liberty
where there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirements of the law
have been so ignored or distorted that the party is substantially and effectively denied
what is included in the term due process of law, or where some other circumstance
exists which would make it wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction.
7

Brvant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967) ; Gallegos v. Turner. 17 Utah
2d 273, 490 P.2d 386 (1965). See also Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah
1977).
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion) a plurality of the
United States Supreme Court agreed that the "ends of justice" require that a petitioner
filing a successive petition supplement his constitutional claim with a colorable
showing of factual innocence. Although acceptance of the Kuhlmann plurality
standard has varied among the circuits that have addressed the issue, Appellant
contends that with only Detective Minor's testimony, and the prosecutions mention of
it in closing statements, forming the only basis for the necessary "intent" to commit
aggravated robbery, now, without this testimony as it is untrue and the requisite
suppression of its mention in closing, the Appellant Mr. Hendricks is shown, inter
alia, to be factually innocent of the crime of aggravated robbery.
And, despite the preference for finality in litigation, re judicata does not apply
to habeas proceedings. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 7. The rationale for not applying res
judicata goes again to the heart of the writ: habeas proceedings are designed to hold
the government accountable to the judiciary for a person's imprisonment. Therefore,
"access to the courts on habeas must not be thus impeded". Id. at 8. See also
Daniels v. Blackburn. 763 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1985) (Res judicata principles do not
apply in habeas corpus proceedings).
POINT II
8

APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 12
of the Utah State Constitution guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel in
criminal prosecutions. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) the Supreme
Court established a two-prong standard to govern ineffective assistance claims. To
obtain reversal of a conviction the defendant must prove (1) that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this approach and stated the following in
State v. Geary 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985):
In challenging a conviction on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden to
show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance
in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome
of the trial would probably have been different but for
counsel's error. Codiannav. Morris 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983)
Failure to meet either of these requirements will defeat a claim based on
ineffectiveness of counsel. Additionally the claims must be "sufficient to overcome
the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised
reasonable professional judgment". State v. Frame 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
To satisfy the requisite "prongs" of the Strickland and overcome the strong
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presumption of Frame, the court may conclude that a single error rendered counsel's
assistance ineffective, but it must consider the totality of the circumstances in making
its determination. Strickland 466 U.S. at 690. It is exactly such a "totality of
circumstances" that the Appellant prays this Court consider. For it is all too easy for a
court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude
that a particular act or omission of counsel was reasonable, thereby voiding a claim
of ineffectiveness.
Initially, the Appellant developed a somewhat strained relationship with his
trial counsel, Mr. Stephen Laker, which hampered communication between the two.
In the course of the trial proceedings, Mr. Laker met with the Appellant one time.
Surely facing a serious first-degree felony charge requires more due diligence when
a conviction could result in a sentence that would expire with the Appellant's own
natural life.
Specifically, the Appellant points to his attorney's failure to make any attempt to
suppress the supposed statement Appellant made to Detective Minor. Supposed
statement Appellant now has proof never occurred. (Affidavit of G. Scott Jensen no. 5
and no. 6). The likelihood of the Appellant prevailing on the suppression of these
inculpatory statements and confession is evidenced by the discussion in chambers
on-the-record, between Judge Roth and Mr. Laker;
The Court: "you were aware that testimony would be at least attempted to be
introduced today at trial?"
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Mr. Laker: "yes"
The Court:". . . it would have been logical to have a suppression hearing prior
to trial . . ."
The Court:". . . if I do that now, we have a mistrial".
(Transcript Pages 115, line 11 through line 15)
Despite counsel's forewarning from the trial court, and despite counsel's client
urging him to investigate and make claim, counsel failed to investigate or make the
claim.
In addition, Appellant points to his counsel's failure to cross-examine many of
the State's witnesses (Transcript, page 44, page 58, page 87, page 90). Counsel's
failure to make an opening statement to the jury (Transcript, page13). Counsel's
failure to call witnesses on behalf of the defense and in presenting no defense
whatsoever (Transcript, page 129).
During the course of the trial an argument ensued between counsel and his
client, over Mr. Hendricks requesting that he be called to testify on his own behalf. In
the course of this verbal exchange, counsel voir dired his own client, on the record,
that if he took the stand on his own behalf that the State would introduce evidence of a
prior conviction (Transcript, page 124). It should be noted that this issue was never
addressed by the trial court.
It is also possible that counsel committed perjury before the trial court in
response to the Court's Order that counsel interview Attorney G. Scott Jensen and

1

!

produce him before the Court (Transcript, page 122 and Affidavit of Q. Scott Jensen).
Appellant contends the outcome of his trial would have been different. To
prevail, the Appellant must:
show that but for the alleged deficiencies of counsel
there exists any reasonable probability that the jury's
verdict would have been different, He [must show]
that the adversarial process of the trial was so undermined
that the jury could not have produced a just result.
Frame at 405.
Section 76-2-307 of the Utah Code Ann. (1991) "Voluntary termination of efforts
prior to offense" states as follows:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an actor's
criminal responsibility arises from his own conduct or from being
party to the commission of the offense, the actor voluntarily
terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either:
(1)
Gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement
authorities or the intended victim; or
(2)
Wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in the
commission.
Appellant states and the record clearly shows that he took no Class II narcotics
when he left Murray's Pharmacy on December 8, 1987 (Transcript, page 37, line 8)
through line 15) while there were large amounts of other scheduled controlled
substances and cash present, the Appellant, armed with an unloaded non-functional
weapon, simply stated, "I was only kidding anyway" and left the store (Transcript,
page 33, line 15 and page 37, line 14).
1 The Section 76-2-307 U.C. Ann. (Utah Code Annotated) Affirmative defense
of voluntary termination arises here not as a point of appeal, but only as a
demonstration of a defense strategy left unused by counsel. It is utilized here for a
showing satisfaction of both prongs of Stickland in that Appellant's actions constituted
12

its definition yet defense counsel failed to recognize, raise, or employ it.
These facts show an uncanny parroting of Section 76-2-307 (2) of the Utah
Code Ann. wherein the Appellant, "[WJholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness
in the commission", of an aggravated robbery. Appellant contends that defense
counsel's failure to recognize such an elemental affirmative defense, let alone raise
or utilize it, constitutes both a showing of prejudice and a deficiency in performance
as required by Strickland and Frame.
The Appellant, Mr. Hendricks, situation meets the criteria in totality of
circumstances that the Court's find most frequently results in reversal. Mr. Hendricks
was completely deprived of any defense or allowed to testify on his own behalf,
because of an untold conclusion[s] by defense counsel. See State v. Dumaine. 783
P2d 1184, 1191 (Arizona 1989); and Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 34 Led 2d 330,
93 SCt 351 (1972).
Finally, accord defense counsel Mr. Laker's failure to file a timely Docketing
Statement in the correct court or to perfect appeal. Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873 (Utah
1990); Fernandez v. Cook. 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) as cited in Jensen v. Deland.
795 P.2d 619 (Utah 1989).
POINT III
WITH NEW EVIDENCE AND RECOGNITION OF APPELLANTS VOLUNTARY
TERMINATION OF CRIMINAL EFFORTS, FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING
OF GUILT ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-302, requires the State to prove
13

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant, in the course of committing the robbery,
(a) used a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or a deadly
weapon; (b) cause serious bodily injury upon another. Part (III) of Section 76-6-302
provides that "For the purposes of this part an act shall be deemed to be:
In the course of committing a robbery if it occurs
in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery. In order to satisfy its burden it is
incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the Defendant unlawfully and intentionally at least
attempted to take personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or from his immediate presence
against his will accomplished by means of force or fear
and that in doing so he used a firearm".
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed a rather strict standard of review when
the Court is asked to review the evidence to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction. State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), where the Court
stated:
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may
be reasonably drawn from it in a light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence so
viewed is so sufficiently inclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted.
State v. Fetree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v. McCardellf Utah,
652P.2d942, 945 (1982V, State v. Martinez. Utah, 709 P.2d 355 (1985).
The Appellant contends that even with this standard of review the facts
14

demonstrated in the present case are now clearly controverted. Appellant argues that
with newly discovered evidence (Affidavit of G. Scott Jensen) showing that the
statements to Detective Minor, in fact, never occurred, the State cannot show the
requisite "intent" necessary for a showing that the crime he committed was an
aggravated robbery.
From the Affidavit of G. Scott Jensen;
"5. At no time was I or Mr. Hendricks in an interview
room with Detective Minor on the morning of December
9th, 1987, where I left on any occasion, where Mr.
Hendricks was with Detective Minor alone.
6. Mr, Hendricks did stop Detective Minor in the hallway by the video arraignment room and asked whey he was
being charged with a 1st degree felony, where Detective
Minor stated, "cause a gun was involved" whereupon
Mr. Hendricks went into the video arraignment and waived
preliminary hearing and asked to be sentenced.
7. I do remember a phone call from Stephen Laker on
January 20th, 1988 asking about Mr. hendricks, but at
the time I could not recollect who Mr. hendricks was,
I was not asked about the facts concerning me or Mr.
Hendricks being in the interview room with Detective Minor
or I would have testified to the fats which would have
been inconsistent with Detective Minor's testimony
concerning Mr. Hendricks alleged confession".
Appellant points to the State's own witnesses who admitted that when the
Appellant asked for any Schedule II drugs, he was told that the object of his desire
did not exist in the premises. The witnesses all clearly relate that the Appellant
immediately turned around and walked out of the store the same way that he had
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entered, making the comment, "I was only kidding anyway" (Transcript, page 37,
line 13 through 15).
The State's witnesses made it clear that there were other narcotics available as
well as substantial amount of money which was required to be in the cash register of
the business. There is no argument whatsoever that the Appellant made any attempt
to take any of those items from the possession of the store owner or employee.
These facts clearly indicate that the Appellant voluntarily terminated his
criminal efforts prior to the commission of an aggravated robbery. Section 76-2-307
(2) of the Utah Code Ann, concerns exactly such a scenario, "Voluntary termination
of efforts prior to offense". Therein arises an affirmative defense to exactly such
conduct as was attempted by the Appellant, Mr. Hendricks.
With no requisite intent to commit the crime of aggravated robbery and a
voluntary termination of his efforts prior to the commission of an aggravated robbery,
Appellant is not suggesting that a crime did not take place, rather the Appellant
argues that the uncontroverted facts suggest that Appellant is guilty of an aggravated
assault rather than an aggravated robbery.
Section 76-5-103 of the Utah Code Ann. Aggravated Assault reads as follows:
(1)

(2)

A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as
defined in Sec. 76-5-102 and he;
(a)
Intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b)
Uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Sea 76-1-601 or
other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
Aggravated assault is a third-degree felony.
16

Finally, Appellant contends that the court failed to consider Section 76-3-402
et al, of the Utah Code Ann. Conviction of lower degree of offense,

CONCLUSION
Appellant Lyle C. Hendricks petition for extraordinary relief was improperly
dismissed in Second Judicial District Court. Due to unusual circumstances; newly
discovered evidence of an affidavit by an officer of the court which casts doubt as to
formulation of the requisite intent to commit the crime for which he was convicted.
And a fundamental unfairness in that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel, wherein his defense counsel failed to attempt suppression of prejudicial
testimony, failed to cross-examine witnesses, failed to call witnesses for the defense,
failed to address the jury, deliberately prejudiced his client by subjecting him to a
voir dire in the presence of the jury, and failed to utilize an essential affirmative
defense which, should have resulted in the Appellant's conviction on a lesser
degree of offense.
Wherefore, the Appellant appeals to this Honorable Court to reverse the
decision of the Second Judicial District Court overruling Judge Glasmann's dismissal,
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing, and any other relief this Court deems
necessary.
Dated _&ZL

day of

fA<*4

1993.
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Respectfully Submitted,

.yle/c. Hendricks
Lyl<
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above
Appellant Brief to : Angela F. Micklos
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage pre-paid, this

li*^

day of

/<7H

, 1993.
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ADDENDUM

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LYLE C. HENDRICKS,
\

RULING ON WRIT OF
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

Plaintiff,
vs.
\

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No.

Defendant.

920900575

\

Having examined the file in the above entitled case, I
find that defendant's petition is repetitious of motions
previously made and denied and I therefore am dismissing the
petition on the ground that is frivolous.

DATED this

/2* day of January, 1993.

MICHAEL J.

SMANN, Judge

Ruling
Case No.
Page Two

920900575

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the p

day of January,

1993, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DOCKETING STATEMENT

LYLE C. HENDRICKS,
APPELLANT,
-V-

STATE OF UTAH,
APPELLEE,

Case No: 930055-CA

Jurisdiction
This is an appeal from a final judgement entered in the Second District Court,
for Weber County. This judgement denied appellant relief under Rule 65 U.R.CP. form
his illegal confinement. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.

Statement of the case
Appellant filed with the district court under 65 (b) U.R.CP. based on newly
discovered evidence. In appellant's trial a detective testified appellant confessed to
him about the "reason" for the robbery. This detective testified that appellant's
attorney was present during this confession. The prosecution used this so called
confession to establish intent before the jury. Appellant now has affidavits to prove
this attorney was never present and the confession never took place.

1

Statement of Facts
Appellant was not properly represented at trial. There was never a confession.
This evidence was used to establish intent. The jury found appellant guilty of first
degree robbery. The new evidence viewed in light most favorable to the government
should be allowed. This evidence proves perjury of one of the state's key witnesses.

Issue on Appeal
1.

Newly discovered evidence.

2.

Ineffective assistance of counsel.

3.

Lesser included offence.

4.

Intent to commit robbery.

Related Appeal
This case was heard by this court on direct appeal a decision was entered on
February 5, 1990. The evidence not available at the time.

Respectfully Submitted,

Lyle C. Hendricks

2

Certificate Of Service
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Docketing Statement to the
following. This was done by placing it in the U.S. mail on the undersigned date.
Jan Graham
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
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FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 2 2 1993

00O00

Lyle C. Hendricks,
Petitioner and Appellant,

/'
*

MaryT.Noonan
Clerk of the Court

ORDER

Case No, 930055-CA

v.
State of Utah,
Respondent and Appellee.

This matter is before the court upon appellee's motion to
dismiss appeal, filed February 19, 1993.

Appellant's objection

to the motion was filed March 12, 1993.
Appellee seeks dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Rule
26(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure due to
appellant's failure to timely file a docketing statement.

On

February 18, 1993, appellant filed his docketing statement.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellee's motion
to dismiss is denied.
Dated t h i ^ ^ ^ p ^ a y of March, 1993.
BY T

7/

Regnal W. Garff, Judge
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1 to December 8th of last year, were you working that afternoon^
2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And was Mr. Murray working t h a t

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Mrs. Blackwell, did—would you please explain to

6

afternoon?

the Jury what, if anything, happened at Murray's Pharmacy

7 about 3:30 that afternoon?
8
9

A

Murray and I were in the pharmacy working.

And a

fellow came in with a gun and walked between us, and said

10 he wanted all the class 2 narcotics.
11 didn't have any, and to go see.

Murray told him we

And he said you show me.

12 So Murray went over and opened the drawers and showed him
13 we didn't have.

And he turned and went out of the pharmacy

14 and said I was just fooling anyway, or kidding, I don't
15 remember for sure.
16

Q

And left the store.

Mrs. Blackwell, when you said you and Murray

17 were in the pharmacy, let me direct your attention over to
18 this diagram, Proposed State's Exhibit number 4.

Do you

19 recognize this as a layout of the store, this being the
20 Harrison entrance that's kitty-cornered, the shelves, some
21

tables back here and a gate over here; a fair pharmacy sectioiji?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Is that what you were talking about when you said

24 you and Murray were in the pharmacy area?
25

A

Yes.

37

«

couritoon today?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Would you please point him out?

4

A

Right there.

5

Q

The person in the striped shirt?

6

A

Yes, striped shirt.

7

MS. KNOWLTON:

May the record reflect the Defendant

8 is wearing a striped shirt?
THE COURT:

9

MS. KNOWLTON:

10
11

Yes.

Q

Thank you.

Mrs. Blackwell, is there any doubt in your mind

12 this is the young man?
13

A

No.

14

MS. KNOWLTON:

I have no further questions.

15

THE COURT:

Mr. Laker?

16

MR. LAKER:

No questions.

17

THE COURT:

You may step down, thank you.

May this

18 witness be excused?
19

MS. KNOWLTON:

20

THE COURT:

Mr. Laker?

21

MR. LAKER:

No objection.

22

THE COURT:

You are excused, thank you.

23

MS. KNOWLTON:

24

I have no objection.

The State would call John Stallings.
JOHN STALLINGS

25 called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was

44

He kind of got upset and wouldn f t really talk

would^-say.

to me, wouldn f t really answer my questions.
Q

Okay.
MS. KNOWLTON:

^ -.

I have no further questions.

THE COURT:

Mr. Laker?

MR. LAKER:

No questions of this witness

THE COURT:

You may step down, thank you.

May

this witness be excused?
MS. KNOWLTON:

Yes f your Honor, no cbjecuicn.

MR. LAKER:

No objection.

THE COURT:

You are excused.

MS. KNOWLTON:

The State would call Joe Chesser.

JOSEPH L. CHESSER
called as a witness, and haying been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. KNOWLTON:
Q

Would you please state your name and occupation?

A

Joseph L. Chesser.

I am a police officer for

Ogden City.
Q

And to what division are you specifically assigned?

A

To the Detective Division.

87

Q

Was there more convorsn I;, ion?
, THE COURT:

I am not sure it is clear to me

Bcisely who was in the room at the time this was taking
ace.

Let's go over that again.

Q

Okay, when you got back to the room, one of

2 little interview rooms in the jail, who was there?

A

jn^

dr^jc^T:?

f r i ' g h t T f a f ' f e f . t h e ^ c b n v ' e r s a t i o I T ? s t a r t edV r jJg^T

lrirC"7:Defellde^^
-at,.

.-arraignments^

Svn'd'^theiY^

i n u t e-r-and^ s t a n d i t h e r e o f or : ^a—coupier f of ^•minutes":'';
w a l k e d b a c k up t o t h e - - t o
e at.

where t h e v i d e o

Then

arraignments

f K i l d ^ t h e n ^ h e T f i n a 11 y*come-vba_ck a_nd s a id. t,.hai:" ? if^
^

—

-

•

THE COURT:

..

—

Was there any discussion as. to whether

not this attorney was representing Mr. Hendricks or

A

^IJaP'w^

icld me Mr. Stockdalc had resigned the case, fand^^li^t
iader spirtergothex^vcoriver's'atipn . rA nj^^J

.ding^n^^

Q

A

You don't know the attorney's name?"-

' v:f•HinririkrTlf^was.-^G'ensen .

I a s k e d M::; . Know 1 t o n .

TUF. COURT:
A

Glasses, tall, kind of reddish blond short hair.
THE COURT:

Q

What did ho look 1. i .k^ ?

Go ahead.

Detective Miner, what v/as n e x t — w h o spoke

next,

you recall?
A

heT"Vtated "that'' he ''dlciri "t"' point/ the gun; at ••anybody .

Q

This is Mr. Hendricks

A

Yes .

Q

Okay.

A

Me.

Q

What did you say?

A

I asked him why he went in tiie pharmacy.

Q

Did he have a response?

A

Yes.

Q

What did he say?

A

Ee^tolc^me?^

talking?

What next, or who next spoke?

^t-'*he-rw"a'nte"d7s^
^"to^teli^

rcbke"Ttha tr;r'day7::;rahd;'

5-fCom±n.gTrdov^
thT^ai^
di-vv>dual^-^

r a n d r i he.? wan t e d

*; s.tayphighT^^'Herrdidn^^^
—gQ^thrpjU'.gh'T-.witli'Jk'iXl 1 ng rftim*V
0

What did you say?

A

I can't remember my response.

I asked him more

i •wptuumu

•y^gygy^gwwwiWiiwiMiiiijygijy^iiiiiLit^tj,

M l >H»^'!»•)•»»»»'<*• »'-«MIIIHI%jm«

*

7

3

5
6
7

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Wore thoao nuido available to the

MR. LAKER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

You had those reports?

MR. LAKER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

You were aware that that testimony

defense?

4

8

THE COURT:

would be at least attempted to be introduced today at
trial?

. . - -

—

__^

MR. LAKER: _ Yes-*—'
THE COURT:

\

The only reason for asking the question)

is it seems likely it would have been logical to have
a suppression hearing prior to trial if you v/ere concerned
about the admissibility f rather than right while it was
^S

going before the Jury.
-MR. LAKER:

Well, I w a s — t h e police report is —

17 the whole issue of whether there was counsel or not was
18 very unclear.
19

That part is not in there.

THE COURT:

The record indicates that Scott

20 Jensen was counsel on the morning of the 9th, that he
21 represented the Defendant at the arraignment.

That they

22 waived Preliminary Hearing, and it was bound over to
23 District Court.
24

MR. LAKER:

Well, the problem I have with that,

25 your Honor, is that it i s — I am not sure it was clear
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